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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The paper looks at the issue of absolute and conditional income convergence in the 
EU-15 States, focusing upon the growth incidence of certain fundamental economic 
variables, along with corruption and bureaucracy. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Applying advanced panel data techniques, dating from 
1995 up to 2012, we focus on two discrete European State groups. The first group consists of 
the Southern EU countries (i.e. Greece Belgium, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) and, the 
second group of the Northern EU countries (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, UK).  
Findings: The results demonstrate that investment share, human capital and country 
openness appear as robust growth drivers; whereas, inflation and government consumption 
hamper growth. However, corruption and bureaucracy seem to affect differently growth of 
the two groups of the European States.   
Practical Implications: Certain policy implications and obligations accrue to the Southern 
European countries vs. the Northern European ones, with respect to the effects and 
consequences of specific fundamental economic variables, along with corruption and 
bureaucracy, towards the absolute and conditional income convergence in the EU-15. 
Originality/Value: Macroeconomic policies that affect economic growth, directly through 
their effect on physical and human capital accumulation and macroeconomic stability, 
reflected in low and stable rates of inflation and government consumption, would indeed 
increase growth in EU. Taking advantage of the European integration, in terms of real 
convergence, institutions seem also quite essential ingredients. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past decades, income convergence remains a central macroeconomic 
issue around which a significant proportion of the recent growth literature has 
evolved. Ever since 1956, Solow’s neoclassical model has produced endless debate 
on the empirical validity of its predictive power upon income convergence. Baumol 
(1986) found evidence of convergence, but only within developed countries. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) argued that poorer countries grow faster than richer ones; 
whereas, Quah (1993), by augmenting Solow’s model with human capital, found no 
such convergence. Ever since, this debate goes on strong.  
 
In the classic growth literature, two fundamental notions of convergence are the 
“absolute” and the “conditional” convergence case. Following, thus, Sala-i-Martin 
(1996a), absolute β-convergence implies that incomes across countries approach the 
same steady state level; whereas, conditional convergence implies that different 
economies converge to different steady state levels depending on cross section 
differences in resources, savings rates, technology, population growth, etc. This fact 
is due to the endogenous convergence theory according to which, the main factors of 
convergence are the expenditure for research, technology and human capital. These 
factors are endogenous and offset the diminishing returns to capital. According to 
Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998), poorer countries may converge to the richer ones 
only if they can assimilate the technological progress that emanates from developed 
economies, improving under this way the effectiveness of human capital and the 
ability for innovation.  
 
In this context, it would be interesting to investigate whether or not stronger 
evidence of convergence exists, among groups of EU countries which are 
characterized by similar socioeconomic features; that is, whether or not convergence 
clubs exist, in accordance to Baumol (1986).  
 
In order to study explicitly the determinants of growth in Europe, two distinct groups 
of countries are considered here: A first group is consisted by the five “Southern” 
European countries, EU-5 hereafter, (i.e. Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal). 
These Mediterranean countries share some common characteristics such as the 
natural conditions and resources. Additionally, in these countries, the agricultural 
sector is a vital component in terms of share of Gross Domestic Product. Moreover, 
until the mid-1990s, the EU-5 countries were distinguished from the “Western 
European” countries, by certain interrelated structural characteristics; such as 
uneven distribution of human resources, formalism and legalism, and with the 
exception of Italy and France, by absence of a typical European administrative elite 
(Ziller, 2001; Bevir et al., 2003; Tsoulakis, 1981; Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; 
Goetz, 2001; Giner, 1985; Pagoulatos, 2003). Moreover, Goetz (2001) notes that 
there is a general understanding that the four bureaucracies share some empirical 
parallels or similarities while according to Giner (1985) and Pagoulatos (2003) one 
may speak of the “state in Southern Europe”. Finally, Thalassinos and Dafnos 
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(2015) examine the driving forces that influence the development of the Economic 
and Monetary Union and more specifically the challenges that the EU’s Southern 
member states face. 
   
A second group of “Western European” countries is formed by the remaining 
“Northern” European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK); that is, EU-9 hereafter4. The growth 
experience of these two groups of countries could be much different. Their long-
term performance could be associated with macroeconomic stability, financial 
development, trade regime, or institutional characteristics.  
 
Accordingly, then, this paper aims first, at analyzing the growth and convergence 
issue within the two distinct groups of the EU-5 and the EU-9 countries. Second, to 
examine whether or not consideration of two discrete state groups, provide evidence 
of existence of different convergence speeds. Third, we need to test for conditional 
convergence, where specific drivers of growth are considered to trace out the 
dominant factors of the convergence process in the examined countries. Finally, we 
share light on the growth effects of corruption and bureaucracy in these two groups 
of countries.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the main 
growth determinants and reviews the relevant literature, Section 3 presents the 
dynamics of corruption and bureaucracy in EU-5 and EU-9 countries, Section 4 
analyzes our modeling approach, Section 5 describes our research results. Finally, 
certain concluding remarks and further research suggestions are provided in the last 
section.  
 
2. Growth Determinants  
 
It is well known that a quite wide range of studies has investigated the factors 
underlying economic growth and convergence. Thus, using various theoretical and 
methodological approaches, these studies have focused on a different set of 
explanatory variables and offered various insights to the sources of economic 
growth. The importance attached to the above factors has led to an enormous 
amount of empirical studies, on the relationship between these factors and economic 
growth per se. Among others, investment in physical and human capital, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and trade openness are considered as main drivers of 
growth and convergence. Although a positive correlation between these variables 
and GDP growth has been considered, a part of the relevant empirical literature has 
found a negative association5.  
                                                     
4Luxembourg was excluded as it is typically considered an outlier. 
5A number of recent studies have been more skeptical about the robustness of this impact and 
suggest that the statistical significance of this correlation depends on the specification of the 
empirical model, the period under consideration and the proxy variables for these factors. 
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In this paper, in order to test for conditional convergence, a certain number of 
growth determinants are being considered. More specifically, in addition to the 
variables suggested by the augmented neoclassical Solow-Swan model, inflation, 
government consumption, openness, as well as corruption and bureaucracy are also 
considered. We mention these variables, in a summarized form. 
 
2.1 Investment and growth 
Investment is a fundamental determinant of economic growth and the catching-up 
process, identified by both neoclassical and endogenous growth models. More 
specifically, Solow (1956) suggests that the larger the investment and saving rate, 
the more cumulative capital per worker becomes. Furthermore, in the long-run 
economic growth, new growth theories stress the importance of investment, 
especially in human and physical capital6. 
  
2.2 Human capital and growth 
During the past century, researchers continue focusing upon the impact of human 
capital on economic growth, by increasing the facilities of education and health. 
Schultz (1971) and Becker (1962) both developed and analyzed growth models, 
augmented by human capital and found significant positive association between 
economic growth and human capital formation. Also, a number of empirical studies 
documented a strong and positive relationship between human capital and economic 
growth. However, this relationship between these variables remains so far 
ambiguous7.  
  
2.3 Inflation and growth 
Macroeconomic policies can affect economic growth directly through their effect on 
accumulation of capital, or indirectly through their impact on the efficiency with 
which the factors of production are used, thus sending important signals to the 
private sector about the country’s authorities, in the form of efficiently managing the 
economy for profitable investments. Moreover, macroeconomic stability is reflected 
in low and stable rates of inflation (Mirestean  and Tsangarides, 2009). However, 
considerable ambiguity surrounds the impact of the average rate of inflation on the 
rate of economic growth, at the theoretical level. The impact of inflation on output 
growth may also take place indirectly, via the inflation uncertainty channel. 
Friedman (1977) argues that changes in inflation induce erratic responses by 
                                                     
6For the relationship between investment and economic growth see empirical studies by 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985), De Long and Summers (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Mankiw et al. (1992), Auerbach et al. (1994), Barro and Sala-i- Martin (1995), Κhan and 
Kumar (1997), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Bond et al. (2001). 
7See for example Rosenzweig (1990), Barro (1991), Kyriacou (1991), World Bank (1993), 
Pritchett (1996), Agiomirgianakis et al. (2002), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Bloom et al. 
(2004).  
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monetary authorities, which may lead to more uncertainty about future inflation 
(Friedman’s hypothesis)8.  
  
2.4 Government consumption and growth  
Government activities may increase economic growth or impede it, depending on net 
productivity impact of these activities (Karras, 2001). Of particular interest in the 
literature, is the impact of government size on economic growth (Kwabena, 2002). 
The main conclusion from the literature here is that there may be both a “size” effect 
of government intervention, as well as specific effects stemming from the financing 
and composition of public expenditure. At a low level, the productive effects of 
public spending are likely to exceed the social costs of raising funds. On the 
contrary, very large government expenditure to GDP ratios tends to have a negative 
effect on economic activity of the private sector and reduce economic growth (Yin et 
al., 2003). Also, government expenditure and the required taxes may reach levels 
where the negative effects on efficiency, and hence growth, starts dominating. These 
negative effects may be more evident where the financing relies heavily on more 
“distortionary” taxes (e.g. direct taxes) and where public expenditure focuses on 
“unproductive” activities (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001) 9. 
  
2.5 Openness and growth 
Although openness as an empirical concept was not formally and econometrically 
investigated until the World Bank’s World Development Report (1991), there are 
good theoretical reasons for supporting that openness enhances economic growth 
and convergence through various channels, such as exposure to competition and 
exploitation of comparative advantage, technology transfer and diffusion of 
knowledge, etc. More specifically, the neoclassical approach explains the gains from 
trade liberalization by comparative advantages, in the form of resource endowment, 
or differences in technology. On the other hand, the endogenous growth literature 
asserts that trade openness positively affects per capita income and growth through 
economies of scale and technological diffusion between countries (Mirestean and 
Tsangarides, 2009)10. However, though several studies have demonstrated the 
positive effect of increased trade on convergence, the growth-openness connection 
remains an open question in the empirical literature11.  
 
                                                     
8Recent empirical studies as in Fountas (2001), Fountas et al. (2004), Karanasos et al. 
(2004), Apergis (2004), Conrad and Karanasos (2005) and Thornton (2008) support 
Friedman’s  hypothesis. 
9Empirically a negative effects is found in Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Bassanini et al. (2001), a positive effect in Caselli et al. (1996) while in 
Levine and Renelt (1992), Bassanini et al. (2001), empirical evidence is not robust. 
10Rodriguez (2007) discusses recent empirical research regarding the link between openness 
and growth in cross-section data.   
11Several scholars have criticized the robustness of these findings especially on 
methodological and measurement grounds (see for example, Levine and Renelt, 1992; 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000; Vamvakidis, 2002; Kaitila, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007). 
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2.6 Corruption and growth 
Corruption and its economic growth implications have received special attention 
among several economists, during the recent decades12. In this case, we face two 
fundamental schools of thought, with respect to the corruption-economic growth 
nexus. The first school of thought holds that corruption has beneficial effect on 
economic growth. Its supporters argue that corruption (that is, several types of 
bribery payment to state bureaucrats) acts like greasing oil that mainly “lubricates” 
the engine of economic growth, as it helps government officials to make the 
progress of project approval “more efficient”. Thus, the proponents of this school, 
including Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Acemoglou and Verdier (1998), suggest 
that corruption induces positive efficiency in the overall economy. The second 
school of thought maintains the view that corruption negates economic growth, by 
adding to the cost of business functioning and introducing significant uncertainty in 
the business decision making process. The proponents of this second school of 
thought, including Murphy et al. (1993), Gould and Amero-Reyes (1983), Mauro 
(1995), Mo (2001), Monte and Papagni (2001), suggest that corruption is indeed 
disadvantageous to businesses and business people, especially for those that lack the 
necessary cash flows and the established and necessary lobbying power to either 
bribe or lobby the bureaucrats13.    
 
2.7 Bureaucracy and growth 
Similarly to corruption, there is no consensus concerning the effects of bureaucracy 
on economic growth. During the last years, the negative effect of bureaucracy 
prevails. Marx’s theory on bureaucracy states that it is a cost to society that can be 
accepted, insofar as it makes social order plausible and maintains it by enforcing the 
rule of law. Chowdhury (2006) showed, referring to tax officials, how their rent-
seeking behavior causes loss in government revenue and thereby stagnates country’s 
economic growth. The above inference based also upon the “Smithian” view (Evans 
and Rauch, 1999) states that government, regardless of its organizational form, is the 
enemy of growth as soon as it goes beyond protecting property rights14. Rauch 
(1995) supports that the “Weberian” bureaucracy has a twofold effect on growth: the 
negative one emanates from taxation over returns of private investment while the 
positive comes from the benefits of complementary inputs such as infrastructure 
development.    
 
3. The Dynamics of Corruption and Bureaucracy in EU-5 and EU-9 
Countries  
                                                     
12The word corrupt when used as an adjective literally means "utterly broken" and was first 
used by Aristotle.  
13See also, Mauro (1995, 1998), LaPorta et al. (1999), Labsdorff (2003), Papaconstanstinou 
et al. (2013), Jalil et al.    (2016). 
14Rauch (1995) and Evans and Rauch (1999) found a positive effect of bureaucracy on 
growth. Ayal and Karras (1996) detected a negative effect of bureaucracy (See also 
Papaconstanstinou et al., 2013). 
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This particular section focuses on answering the following question: “do the two 
groups of the EU member states (the EU-9 and the EU-5) present through time two 
distinct patterns of behavior, with respect to corruption and bureaucracy?” Since the 
question is posed at a group level, it can be answered by comparing two variables – 
the mean Corruption Perception Index for the EU-9 countries, and the mean value 
for the EU-5 countries (Figure 1a). The answer, next, is based on comparing the 
trends in both values, over time. Respectively, in Figure 1b the mean value of 
Bureaucracy measure is presented, for the two groups of countries.  
 
The picture we get from Figure 1a is quite convincing: “the average corruption index 
for the EU-9 European countries is placed above the EU-5 average and remains 
unchanged through the time15”. The Southern European countries which are 
characterized by high corruption present, in average, a considerable improvement at 
the beginning of the period, but after a long period of stability, the average position 
of the group has been deteriorated, especially in the crisis years. It is clear that the 
“clean” North rests “clean”, but the corrupted South becomes even more corrupted 
in these crisis years.  
 
Figure 1b next, shows bureaucracy dynamics as they are measured by the average 
value, both in the EU-9 and EU-5 countries. Τhe EU-5 average is being positioned 
above EU-9 average, thus revealing that the EU-9 countries are less bureaucratic. 
Although the two groups display similar behavior, one can observe a significant 
reduction in bureaucracy in the EU-9 country group, while the “bureaucratic” South 
makes only a little such progress and remains “bureaucratic”.   
 
        Figure 1a: Corruption Index                     Figure 1b: Bureaucracy 
 
 Source: Own elaboration using data from Transparency International and The Heritage 
Foundation. 
                                                     
15 We note that the higher the Corruption Index is, the cleaner the country. 
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In Figures 2a and 2b, the Corruption Index evolution is presented. On the left we can 
see “The clean North” and on the right the “corrupted South”. Furthermore, a 
comparative look at these two figures reveals two distinct patterns of corruption.  
Specifically, the Nordic countries seem to follow parallel paths through the time. In 
this group, Finland, Denmark and Sweden, used to be and remain the cleanest 
countries. Of a great interest is the performance of Belgium, which being the most 
corrupted state in 1995 and especially in the late 1990, improved its position in the 
years after 2000, but still remains the most corrupted in 2010.  
 
  Figure 2a: Corruption Index in EU-9         Figure 2b: Corruption Index in EU-5    
 
     
 Source: Own elaboration using data from Transparency International. 
     
In contrast, the five Mediterranean countries, after improving their relative position 
in the corruption ranking, were characterized by stable corruption levels up to 2007; 
but in the recent years, they have followed different corruption evolution paths. 
France, Spain and Portugal reported a progress, whereas Greece with Italy fell 
behind.  
 
Finally, looking at the dynamics of Bureaucracy within the two groups of countries 
reveals two obviously different patterns of bureaucracy (Figures 3a and 3b). The 
bureaucratic structures in the Nordic countries, which in 1995 were characterized by 
significant differences, share some empirical parallels or similarities in the early 
2000. After a period of dramatic drop of bureaucracy, these countries seem to 
become more bureaucratic, converging to a higher level in the years after the global 
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crisis. Contrary to the North, the Mediterranean countries, with the exception of 
Spain, fail to improve their position and seem to diverge. 
 
      Figure 3a: Bureaucracy in EU-9    Figure 3: Bureaucracy in EU-5     
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from The Heritage Foundation 
 
4. Theoretical Foundation and Research Focus 
 
4.1 Methodological Issues 
The first research efforts on convergence were cross-sectional studies, with 
β­convergence holding when the coefficient of a regression of GDP per capita 
growth rates on its initial level is negative16. More recent approaches make use of 
time series techniques and examine their integration properties. More formally, time 
series tests of convergence focus on the notion of “stochastic” convergence; that is, 
the per capita income disparities between economies should follow a stationary 
process (Bernard and Durlauf, 1995, 1996) 17. Time-series unit root testing has been 
often criticized for its limited power and poor size properties (Haldrup and Jansson, 
2006); whereas, convergence in the strict sense of Bernard and Durlauf appears to be 
a difficult hypothesis to confirm (Greasley and Oxley, 1997). Furthermore, 
Strazicich et al. (2004) note that in contrast to the cross-sectional studies, the time 
series results are less clear18.  
                                                     
16Cross sectional studies generally support the convergence hypothesis (Baumol, 1986; De 
Long, 1988; Grier and Tullock, 1989; Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-
Martin, 1996b). 
17See Durlauf and Quah (1999) for a survey of the convergence testing literature based on 
both cross-section and time-series data.  
18Campbell and Mankiw (1989) do fail to find convergence among OECD countries which 
display similar economic characteristics; Quah (1990), Ben-David (1994), and Bernard and 
Durlauf (1991, 1995, 1996) find little evidence among a large number of countries, and 
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New testing procedures for the convergence hypothesis using panel data have been 
developed, quite recently though. Panel data analysis endows regression analysis, 
with both a spatial and temporal dimension. The superiority of panel data methods 
over cross-country growth regressions has been highlighted often in the empirical 
literature (Islam, 1995). The panel data analysis takes into account (a) the 
heterogeneity into the units of analysis, by allowing individual-specific variables, (b) 
gives more variability and less collinearity among variables and, (c) it is also suited 
for studying the dynamics of change (Baltagi, 1995). The panel approach can 
additionally capture the influence of certain periods of time on the economic growth, 
e.g. economic recessions and   financial crises, by including dummy variables in the 
panel regression19. More evidently, panel data studies generally support the 
convergence hypothesis (Islam, 1995; Caseli, 1996; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001; 
Bassanini et al., 2001; Sarajevs, 2001; Borys et al., 2008; Cuaresma et al., 2008; 
Szeles and Marinescu, 2010). 
 
With respect to specification choice, we emphasize Islam’s observation that country-
specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, and hence, random 
effects specification is accepted as unsuitable. Moreover, following Hsiao (1981) 
and Baltagi (1995), the choice of fixed effects option is more appropriate when the 
research focuses on a specific set of N countries, which are not drawn randomly 
from a large population, and outcomes of the study are viewed as conditional on this 
set of countries20. This is our particular research direction here, as the EU-9 and the 
EU-5 countries share a few common characteristics discussed earlier.   
 
4.2 Model specification and variables description 
According to the convergence theory, the main factor explaining the GDP growth is 
the initial level of per capita GDP. Thus, apart from the lagged (log) level of per 
capita GDP (which is considered as the convergence variable) our model will be 
extended by including an augmented set of explanatory variables. The obvious 
candidates to form part of the group are those variables which are explicitly implied 
by economic theory: the investment share and some proxy for human capital. 
Together with these basic variables, other which are considered to be relevant to 
economic growth have been included in the econometric specification. The 
specification is given by eq. 1 below:  
 
 
(1) 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Carlino and Mills (1993), Cunado et al. (2003), Beliu et al. (2004) do not find general 
evidence of convergence. 
19The panel approach finds faster rates of conditional convergence compared with the single 
cross-section approach. See also Sarajevs (2001) for relative issues.  
20See also Sarajevs (2001), Greene (2000). 
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where  is the annual growth rate of real per capita 
GDP in country i,  is the (log) lagged per capita GDP of country i, INV share 
investment, EDU the average years of schooling over 15 years, INFL inflation rate, 
GOV government consumption as percentage of GDP, OPEN the openness of the 
economy as trade in percentage of GDP, COR and BUR are the corruption and 
bureaucracy indices.  
 
We expect to find positive relationships between the economic growth on a side and 
the investment share on physical and human capital as well as the openness on the 
other side. Also, a negative relationship between growth with the level of inflation 
and government consumption is expected. The impact of corruption and bureaucracy 
might differ in the two subgroups of countries due to the specific characteristics of 
the countries in the group.    
 
The variables used are described in Table 1. The sample consists of two sub-groups 
of the EU-14, i.e. the EU-5 and the EU-9 countries. Moreover, for the sake of 
robustness we drop Luxembourg which is considered an outlier. We also construct a 
dummy variable to account for the financial crisis21, which is assumed to be 
exogenous as described in Table 1.  
 
We test the convergence hypothesis using the growth rate of GDP per capita (the 
variable  as the dependent variable and the lagged by one year values of 
per capita GDP in natural logarithms ( ), as the core explanatory variable 
across all specifications. For the convergence hypothesis to hold the coefficient 
on  is expected to be negative.  
 
We control for the impact of investment in physical as well as in human capital on 
economic growth, using two variables: investment share as percentage of GDP 
(INV) measuring the overall level of investment in the country, and human capital 
(EDU). We expect higher investment in physical capital and human capital to have a 
positive impact on economic growth (positive coefficient).  
 
The impact of macroeconomic stabilization policies are captured by inflation rate 
(INFL) and government expenditure (GOV). We expect higher levels of inflation 
and government expenditure to have a negative impact on GDP growth. 
 
The relative importance of trade for conditional convergence is measured by trade 
openness (OPEN). Trade openness is measured as the ratio of exports plus imports 
to GDP. A positive coefficient on openness would indicate a positive impact of trade 
on growth.  
 
                                                     
21The financial crisis of 2007 touched all the EU countries but in the Mediterranean 
economies the depth of the resulting recession was the largest (see also, Alexe, 2012; 
Stanišić, 2012).   
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To control for the impact of institutions on growth two variables are considered: 
corruption and bureaucracy. In our specification we use the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) from International Transparency data base as a measure of corruption 
(COR). The CPI is measured on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is 
perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. As regards 
the data of bureaucracy, and given that the quality of government expressed through 
bureaucratic structure is reflected at the level of economic freedom of every country, 
we use the variable BUR=1-economic freedom. The index of economic freedom is 
published annually by the Heritage Foundation. The higher the value of this index 
(economic freedom) the lower the level of government interference. 
 
Table 1: Variables description and data sources 
 
Natural logarithm of the real per capita GDP constant (2005) 
lagged by one year 
UNCTAD 
INV Investment share as percentage of GDP PWT 7.1 
EDU 
Index of human capital per person, based on years of 
schooling (Barro/Lee, 2012) and returns to education 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994) 
PWT 8.0 
INFL Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
World Development 
Indicators-WDI 
GOV 
General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
OPEN Sum of imports and exports as % of GDP World Bank-WB 
COR 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  
Level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0–100, where 0 
means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 
means it is perceived as very clean. 
(Transparency 
International-IT) 
BUR 
1-Economic freedom based on 10 quantitative and qualitative 
factors. Each of the ten economic freedoms is graded on a 
scale of 0 to 100.  
The Heritage 
Foundation 
DUM Crisis Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 2008   
 
5.   Results 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained from the estimation of the fixed effects 
regressions using annual panel data for the EU-9 and EU-5 for the period 1995-
2012. The estimated results are rather satisfactory and give some interesting insides 
for the convergence process of these two distinct groups. Furthermore, the F-statistic 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that intercepts are the same for all countries 
supporting appropriateness of the Fixed Effects model. 
 
Results concerning the unconditional convergence are presented in columns 1 and 2. 
The negative and significant coefficient of the lagged per capita GDP provides 
evidence of absolute convergence in EU-9 as well as in EU-5. Τhe explanatory 
power of the model is relatively low (R2=0,345 and 0,233 for the EU-9 and EU-5 
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respectively) highlighting the need for the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables.  
 
Thus, in a second step investment share and the years of education as a measure of 
physical and human capital, are added, while the inflation rate, and government 
consumption enter in the model to measure macroeconomic stability. Finally, the 
effect of trade openness is examined (columns 3 and 4). Again, growth depends 
negatively on initial GDP, indicating conditional β-convergence. The investment 
share enters positively22, (see e.g. Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992) as it was 
expected and is significant at the 1% significance level. Turning to the average years 
of schooling, the positive and significant coefficient for the EU-9 indicates that 
education is growth enhancing in this group of countries. Contrary, in specification 4 
for the EU-5, the human capital enters with a non significant coefficient. The minus 
sign of the coefficient for the inflation indicates a growth hampering effect23. 
Inflation has a significant negative impact on growth, reflecting a reduction in 
purchasing power and a lower income performance. Also, government consumption 
enters the equation with a negative sign implying a negative relationship between 
government expenditures and growth in the EU-9 countries as well as in EU-5 
(columns 3 and 4). Finally, Inclusion of trade openness in the equation reveals a 
positive but non-significant coefficient for both groups and the variable is excluded 
from the next models, since it is never significant. These results are in line with 
many others researchers.  
 
In the next step, the model is modified by considering two institutional variables: 
corruption and bureaucracy (columns 5 and 6). The results provide mixed evidence 
for the EU-9 and EU-5 with coefficients appearing with the expected sign for the 
EU-9 and with opposite signs in the EU-5 countries. More specifically, for the 
northern group of countries coefficient of corruption is significant with positive 
value and comes in accordance to the theory, considering that an increase of CPI 
provides evidence of low corruption implying high level of functionality without 
wasting public money, correct distribution and confidence for the investments from 
the abroad. On the contrary, bureaucracy although appearing with the expected sign, 
is not significant, implying that it does not affect growth when CPI and the other 
control variables are included in the model. Of great interest are the results for the 
group of EU-5 countries, in which coefficients of both the corruption and the 
bureaucracy enters with opposite sign than expected. More precisely, the coefficient 
of corruption is negative but not significant. As it concerns to bureaucracy, its 
coefficient enters the equation with a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
giving support to the “Weberian” bureaucracy, the positive effect is due to the 
benefits of complementary inputs like the development of infrastructures, which 
                                                     
22Czasonis and Quinn (2012) found that capital formation was one of the root causes of 
convergence of the Eastern European countries to German. 
23For a detailed study of this relationship, see Barro (1995). 
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took place particularly in Greece Spain and Portugal through the European 
Structural Funds.   
 
Table 2:  Conditional β-convergence in the EU-9 and EU-5 countries, (1995-2012). 
Panel Fixed Effects Models 
Dependent variable:     
 
EU-9 
(1) 
EU-5 
(2) 
EU-9 
(3) 
EU-5  
(4) 
EU-9 
(5) 
EU-5  
(6) 
EU-9 
(7) 
EU-5  
(8) 
Intercept 1,532a 1,574a 1,296a 1,130a 1,129a 0,779a 0,723a 0,792a 
lnyt-1 -0,144a -0,155a -0,136a -0,119a -0,124a -0,098a -0,1a -0,086a 
INV   0,004a 0,003a 0,004a 0,004a 0,004a 0,004a 
EDU   0,044c 0,012 0,055a - 0,072a - 
INFL   -0,011a -0,007a -0,012a -0,003a -0,007a -0,006a 
GOV   -0,004b -0,004a -0,004b -0,003b -0,006 -0,003a 
OPEN   0,0003 0,0002 - - - - 
COR     0,0007a -9e-05 0,0007a - 
BUR     -0,0002 0,002a - 0,002b 
DUM (2008)       -0,021a -0,014a 
Observations 153 85 135 75 135 75 135 75 
Adj. R2 0,3448 0,2327 0,7062 0,8329 0,7086 0,8565 0,8583 0,8516 
F-Statistic 6,07a 6,28a 16,77a 17,64a 12,42a 14,07a 14,69a 19,057a 
Note: EU-9: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK, (Luxembourg is excluded). EU-5: Greece, Italy, France, Spain and 
Portugal.  
a, b, c denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  respectively. 
F-Statistic is used to test the null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept.  
Source: Own Elaboration. 
 
Finally, the negative and significant coefficients of the dummy variable DUM 
(2008), shows that the economic crisis affected negatively the growth performance 
of the EU-524 as well as EU-9 countries (columns 7, 8). 
 
6.  Conclusions and Some Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, using panel data techniques, we investigate the existence of real 
convergence in two distinct groups of European States; that is, the South consisting 
of the states of Greece, Italy, France Spain and Portugal (EU-5), and the North 
consisting of the states of the remaining nine members (EU-9) of the EU. More 
specifically, we examined whether or not consideration of these two discrete state 
groups, provides evidence of existence of different convergence speeds.  
 
                                                     
24See also, Fernandes and Mota (2011) for the PIGS and non-PIGS Eurozone countries, 
Kouretas and Vlamis (2010) for the Greek crisis, and Andrade and Duarte (2011) for the 
Portuguese crisis.     
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Employing a first step analysis on the growth effects of corruption and bureaucracy, 
in these two groups of European States, the dynamics of two institutional variables 
is presented. The picture is convincing in that the North and the South European 
countries indeed present through time, two distinct patterns of behavior. The “clean” 
North rests “clean”, but the corrupted South becomes even more corrupted in these 
certain crisis years. With respect to bureaucracy, once again, the EU-9 country group 
presents a significant improvement, while the “bureaucratic” South made only a 
little such progress and remained “bureaucratic” per se.   
 
With respect to the specification choice, we chose the panel fixed effect model in 
order to account for the heterogeneity into the units of analysis, by allowing 
individual-specific variables. The panel data approach can additionally capture the 
influence of certain periods of time on the economic growth, such as economic 
recessions and   financial crises, by including a certain dummy variable. Now, in 
order to test for the conditional convergence, a certain number of growth 
determinants are being considered. More specifically, in addition to the variables 
suggested by the augmented neoclassical Solow-Swan model (inflation, government 
consumption, and country openness), corruption as well as bureaucracy are also 
taken into account.  
 
Our results, then, reveal that in both countries’ groups, both absolute as well as 
conditional convergence indeed occurred over the certain period of 1995-2012. 
Investment in physical capital is a robust growth driver, while human capital seems 
to impact growth only in the case of the Northern European countries. To the 
contrary, inflation and government consumption, as it was expected, both have a 
strong negative effect thus hampering economic growth. With respect to the country 
openness, in line with other studies, the variable enters with a positive but non-
significant coefficient thus leaving the openness–growth connection as a still open 
scientific question. Also, a special issue of economic interest is our finding that the 
growth effects of corruption and bureaucracy seem to differ across the two groups of 
countries. More specifically, in North Europe, low corruption is related to the per 
capita GDP growth rates, while bureaucracy seems to have only insignificant effects. 
In the South, on the contrary, corruption does not seem to influence economic 
performance, while bureaucracy is also positively related to economic growth.  
 
Overall then, our results suggest that macroeconomic policies that affect economic 
growth, directly through their effect on physical and human capital accumulation 
and macroeconomic stability, reflected in low and stable rates of inflation and 
government consumption, would indeed increase growth in EU. Finally, taking 
advantage of the European integration, in terms of real convergence, institutions 
seem also quite essential ingredients. 
 
We are aware of the fact that the empirical evidence reported in this study is not 
definitely conclusive, since the issue of convergence remains quite complex and 
ambiguous. In particular, we do emphasize that the results are subject to the overall 
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economic evolution, necessarily depending upon the evolving dynamics of the 
economy and the continuous impact of various macroeconomic developments, as the 
current crisis expands. To that end, the continuous use of alternative scientific 
specifications and methods of analysis would also help to deepen our economic 
understanding of the economic convergence issues, both in Europe and elsewhere. It 
is certain that such additional research directions are left for the future scientific 
needs that we are facing. 
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